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Abstract— This paper considers the problem of detecting
extremely low power emissions due to local oscillator (LO)
leakage. This challenging problem arises in cognitive radio (CR)
networks when trying to detect a primary user in reception mode
(the hidden node problem), and also in physical layer security
applications when trying to determine the presence of an eaves-
dropper. In contrast to the numerous works on the detection ofan
active radio transmitter, the problem addressed in this paper still
requires further research. As a matter of fact, previous studies
focus on the theoretical analysis of the detection strategies, and
the reported performances do not take into account the additional
limitations imposed by the existing hardware technologies. In this
paper, we provide an experimental evaluation of two different
detectors based on the averaged periodogram or the total
energy, respectively. Moreover, we propose practical guidelines to
overcome the hardware limitations and maximize the detection
performance. Our experimental measurements using Universal
Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) boards reveal that the widely
employed energy detector is outperformed by the periodogram-
based detector.
I. I NTRODUCTION
A key component of any practical CR system consists on
a spectrum sensing procedure able to detect the temporal
and spatial “holes” or, equivalently, the parts of the spectrum
which are actually exploited by primary transmitters. Recent
works on the subject focus on the detection of (moderately)
weak signals from primary transmitters, and nowadays
the detection of primary transmitters can be viewed as a
(partially) solved problem [1]–[3]. On the other hand, the
detection of primary receivers is a much more challenging
and less explored problem, which has recently attracted
research interest [4]–[7]. For instance, it is also becoming a
subject of research for physical layer security applications,
where the detection of a eavesdropper operating in reception
mode is required, since it aims to extract private information
from a legitimate transmitter-receiver pair [7].
In this work, we explore the possibility of detecting
primary receivers by exploiting the LO power leakage emitted
by the RF front end. This feature is believed to be employed
for the detection of TV license fee evaders in United Kingdom
[8]. In fact, the feasibility of a primary receiver detection
technique based on the LO leakage is addressed in [4],
where a low cost sensor placed in close proximity to the
primary receivers provides a proof-of-concept. Based on this
approach, reported studies in [5]–[7] propose and evaluate









Fig. 1. Scenario: Radiated LO leakage and the measuring device
studies overlooked the real-life hardware constraints, which
could lead to misleading conclusions on the performance of
the proposed innovative schemes. Thus, the inclusion of all
the relevant features of LO leakage signals will allow us to
establish more precise tradeoffs between detection range ad
accuracy, in order to show the feasibility of LO detection.
This paper is organized as follows: A description of
the LO leakage signal model and the proposed statistical
tests are presented in Section II. General guidelines for
the experimental evaluation are exposed in Section III. We
provide a detailed description of the experimental setup
and the obtained results in Section IV. Finally, our main
conclusions are summarized in Section V.
II. LO L EAKAGE DETECTION
In a modern radio receiver with a direct conversion archi-
tecture, the incoming RF signal is converted directly down
to baseband. In this down-conversion stage, a LO tuned to a
certain frequency is mixed with the RF signal. However, an
unavoidable leakage in the LO provokes that a small fraction
of LO power is radiated out of the antenna as it is shown
in Fig.1. This leakage signal is radiated to the environment
by any radio regardless of the underlying architecture and is
generally very weak. For instance, according to the authors
of [7], [9], [10], it varies between−90dBm and−50dBm at
the receiver antenna port and it can be further boosted for
multi-antenna receivers.1
1Notice that in the demodulation of a LO leakage signal, we willhave our
own LO leakage signal altogether with the measured one. However, here we
only focus on the external LO leakage since our own LO leakagecan be












Fig. 2. Measuring device at baseband: LO leakage at baseband.
A. LO Leakage Signal Model
Taking into account the mentioned features of a LO leakage
signal, a suitable and general signal model is given by
s(t) = Ao(t) cos(ωo(t) t+ φo(t)) (1)
whereAo, ωo, and φo denote the amplitude, frequency and
phase of the LO leakage, respectively. In this manner, other
inherent features of the LO such as the phase noise, or the LO
drift, which varies slowly over time, can be better described. A
more simplified signal model found in the literature is typically
given by a deterministic signal with unknown parameters
s(t) = Ao cos(ωo t+ φo) (2)
whereAo, ωo andφo are considered unknown constants. The
signal model given by (2) is particularly useful for short
periods of time. Therefore, we will consider these two models
simultaneously to explain the obtained results.
B. Proposed Detectors
After downconversion and sampling at the Nyquist rate, the
hypothesis testing problem can be written as
H0 : x[n] = w[n], n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1
H1 : x[n] = s[n] + w[n], n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1
where s[n] is the discrete-time version ofs(t) at baseband,
w[n] denotes the additive Gaussian noise, andN is the number
of samples acquired during the sensing period. In the absence
of any knowledge about the LO signal, an energy detector
turns out be a suitable detector. However, some knowledge
about the expected frequency range of the LO peak power can
be usually incorporated into the detection procedure. In this







2 > γ (3)
where x = {x[0], x[1], x[2], . . . , x[N − 1]} is the set of
N complex samples obtained during the sensing period,Xω
denotes the PSD ofx, and[ω1 ω2] is the expected frequency
range. A more tailored detector can be derived by assuming
that the amplitude, frequency, and phase noise are unknown
constants in (1). The statistic test under these assumptions is
given by
TMP (x) = max
ω∈{ω1 ω2}
I(ω) > γ, (4)





















is the averaged (overNw windows of lengthL) periodogram,
andTMP denotes the maximum of the averaged periodogram.
III. M EASUREMENTMETHODOLOGY
The detection of a very low-power LO leakage signal
requires the selection of the sensing parameters providing
maximum sensitivity, and it consists of setting the maximal
gain at the measuring device, and at the same time, a large
time of acquisition. Moreover, it poses stringent requirements
on the transceiver hardware. For instance, the bandwidth must
be wide enough to account for uncertainty in the frequency
of the LO leakage, while at the same time narrow enough
to allow large sensing periods. This bandwidth can be usually
known in advance, since it is given by the maximal clock error
between the external LO leakage and the LO associated with
the measuring device2.
Setting the Gains and Sampling Rate: In order to provide
the maximum sensitivity, the receiver architecture must be
taken into account (See Fig. 2). The gain of a variable gain
amplifier (VGA) may lead the signal to saturation after the
ADC. In fact, after the ADC the signal undergoes a process of
decimation that involves two stages: a low-pass filter followed
by a downsampling of the signal. This process can mask the
saturation, and thus the establishment of the right gain to be
applied in the VGA and LNA without provoking saturation
should avoid any process after the ADC. For this reason, it
is advisable to utilize the smallest possible decimation factor
to identify the maximum gain. In addition, this gain should
allow us to have a suitable margin for the detection of the LO
leakage signal even when its power is below the noise level.
2As an indicative example, the standard IEEE 802.11 a/g/n specifies that the
clock error shall be±20 ppm maximum for the5 GHz band and± 25 ppm
maximum for the2,4 GHz band. Thus, depending on the operating carrier
frequency, the required bandwidth is directly proportional to the employed
sampling frequencyFs and the maximum clock error in ppm.































Fig. 4. N versus LO leakage power: The number of required samples to
achieve aPD = 0,9 andPFA = 0,1, with Fs = 520 kHz and a receiver
gain of 73dB for two detectors
On the other hand, long sensing periods of time involve low
sampling ratesFs and large values of captured samplesN .
The sampling rate is given byFs = ADCclock/M , where
ADCclock refers to the sample rate of the ADC, andM to
the decimation factor. Therefore, low values ofADCclock
are desirable, and higher decimation factorsM would then
be considered depending on the selected values for the
ADCclock. Nevertheless, hardware impairments impose even
more restrictions around a DC frequency where we expect
to have a peak power corresponding to the radiated LO. For
instance, due to the own internal leakage, DC offsets, filter
transients, AC coupling, and high pass filters. For that end,
we demodulate the received signal with a frequency offset
fo far from the frequency range[0 ± ρ], whereρ is around
some kHz (e.g.ρ = 18 kHz for a B210 USRP). By doing
this, a peak power centered aroundfo is observed, while
the spectrum corresponding to the noise remains almost
flat avoiding the aforementioned hardware impairments.
Hence, based on these new restrictions, the sampling rate
should be selected according toFs ≥ 2(ρ + w2 − w1) to
avoid hardware impairments and at the same time cover
the expected bandwidth of the LO signal given byω1 and
ω2. Finally, the non-ideality of the RF part also introduces
some undesirable spikes which can be easily characterized to
discard them (they remain at the same frequency positions
over time) during the detection procedure.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We consider two setups: An initial configuration using a
signal generator and a B210 USRP connected by means of
a cable; and a practical configuration based on two B210
USRPs and OTA transmissions to provide a proof concept
for the proposed detectors. Taking into account the previously
described guidelines which are independent of the particular
board (e.g. the same procedure can be applied to the N210
USRP). A B210 USRP is configured with aFc = 5,6 GHz
and a receiver gain of62dB. We consider a guard frequency































Fig. 5. Measurement under hypothesisH1: Average PSD of the noise signal
measured by a B210 USRP, with aFc = 5,6 GHz, Fs = 520 kHz, N =
10e6,L = 1e6 in blue, andL = 10e4 in red, for a distance of50cm.
range around DC ofρ = 18 kHz, and a LO driftw2 − w1 =
224 kHz (i.e. 40 ppm at 5,6 GHz), which makes us set a
fo = 130 kHz and an approx.Fs = 520 kHz given by an
ADCclock = 25Msps withM = 48.
A. Setup 1: Signal Generator and B210 USRP
The generation of the radiated LO leakage is emulated
by a Agilent E4438C ESG Vector Signal Generator to start
characterizing both the USRP and the radiated LO leakage. In
Fig.4, we show the required number of samples to achieve a
given performance in terms of the detection and false alarm
probabilities versus the LO leakage power. As can be seen,
the detection procedure based on the averaged periodogram
(TMP ) is able to achieve the required performance with a
reduced number of samples (and therefore a shorter sensing
period). This is due to the fact that the signal model assumed
for this detector is closer to the particular characteristics of
the LO leakage signal. Moreover, it can be seen that for lower
LO leakage powers, the measured slope of aTMP detector
indicates that it would be a feasible detector for applications
with more stringent requirements in sensing time or capacity
of storage, while having an affordable computational cost.
B. Setup 2: Measurements between two B210 USRPs
With OTA measurements between two B210 USRPs, we
observe that the received leakage power has a bandwidth of
10 Hz for short periods of time (e.g.20 milliseconds), and
a bandwidth of approximately120 Hz for longer periods of
time (e.g. 2 or more seconds). Such LO inaccuracies can
be better explained with the signal model given in (1). By
connecting two USRPs with a cable, the LO leakage power
measured at the output port was found to be−96 dBm. The
PSD of the captured signals in the presence of an external LO
leakage is shown in Fig. 5 which also supports our mentioned
























 Max Periodogram Detector
Fig. 6. ROC curvePD versusPFA for two detectors, with aFc = 5,6GHz,
Fs = 520 kHz, N = 40e4, a receiver gain62dB, for a distance of50cm,
and a radiated LO leakage
observations about the bandwidth of the LO leakage3. As
can be seen, the LO leakage is found around136 kHz, which
is partially due to our choice of frequency offsetfo = 130
kHz for avoiding the effects in the frequencies close to DC.
The practical performance of the proposed detectors is
first evaluated by means of the receiver operating curve
(ROC), which is shown in Fig. 6. In this experiment, the
two B210 USRPs are separated a distance ofd = 50
cm. Our results show that the energy detector (TEN ) is
clearly outperformed by the method based on the averaged
periodogram (TMP ).
Finally, we analyze the effect of the window lengthL
on the performance of aTMP detector. The results are shown
in Fig. 7, where we can see that the performance of the
proposed periodogram-based detector is not very sensitive
to this parameter. Obviously, very low values ofL make
the proposed procedure similar to the energy detector. On
the other hand, a too large value ofL does not allow the
reduction of the noise impact due to the averaging, and at
the same time leads to an excessive increase of the frequency
resolution, thus losing the ability of “integrating” on the
frequency range of the LO leakage signal.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have evaluated the performance of two
techniques for the detection of the LO leakage of an external
receiver. We conducted some preliminary experiments with a
signal generator and a B210 USRP device to check the per-
formance of the proposed techniques in favorable situations.
As a consequence of these experiments, we have been able to
identify some departures from the ideal conditions, and also
3We employ the Welch method to estimate the PSD. This method divides
the signal into several segments of lengthL which are weighted by a window
(e.g. a Hamming window) that reduces the sidelobes. Finally, these segments









































Fig. 7. Detection probability versus L:PD versus the size of the windowL
in the periodogram for theTM detector, with aFc = 5,6GHz, Fs = 520
kHz, andN = 1e6, and for a distance of10cm
to provide guidelines for the optimal selection of the main
parameters involved in the experimental setup. A second set
of more realistic experiments, based on OTA transmissions,
allowed us to conclude that the idea of detecting receivers by
exploiting their LO leakage is practically feasible. Moreov r,
we have corroborated that a relatively simple technique, based
on the averaged periodogram, is able to accurately exploit
the spectral properties of the LO leakage signal, as well as
its particularities due to the imperfections of the involved
hardware.
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